University of North Dakota

UND Scholarly Commons
Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects

January 2017

The Impact Of Interest Rates Vs. Economic
Growth On The Performance Of Commercial
Banks - An Empirical Analysis Of Commercial
Banks In The U.s.
Justin Edwin Pavek

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses
Recommended Citation
Pavek, Justin Edwin, "The Impact Of Interest Rates Vs. Economic Growth On The Performance Of Commercial Banks - An Empirical
Analysis Of Commercial Banks In The U.s." (2017). Theses and Dissertations. 2135.
https://commons.und.edu/theses/2135

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

THE IMPACT OF INTEREST RATES VS. ECONOMIC GROWTH ON THE
PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL BANKS – AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
COMMERCIAL BANKS IN THE U.S.

by

Justin Edwin Pavek
Bachelor of Science, North Dakota State University, 2011

A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of the
University of North Dakota
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of
Master of Science in Applied Economics

Grand Forks, North Dakota
May
2017

Copyright 2017 Justin Pavek

ii

PERMISSION
Title

The Impact of Interest Rates vs. Economic Growth on The Performance of
Commercial Banks – An Empirical Analysis of Commercial Banks in the
U.S.

Department

Applied Economics

Degree

Master of Science in Applied Economics

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate
degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying
for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or,
in his absence, by the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the School of Graduate
Studies. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part
thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also
understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota
in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.

Justin Pavek
March 21, 2017

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGUES

vi

LIST OF TABLES

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

viii

ABSTRACT

ix

CHAPTER
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW

11

III.

STYLIZED FACTS – DATA SUMMARY

19

IV.

METHODOLOGY

31

V.

RESULTS

37

VI.

CONCLUSION

44

APPENDICES

47

REFERENCES

52

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figures

Page

1. Historical Fed Funds Rate with Recession Indications

5

2. Model 1 Error (All)

42

3. Model 2 Error (All)

42

4. Model 4 Error (All)

42

5. ROA Auto-Correlation to determine Moving Average

48

6. ROA Partial Auto-Correlation to determine Auto-Regression

48

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Tables

Page

1. Variable List

20

2. Dependent Variable Summary Statistics

22

3. Independent Variable Summary Statistics

24

4. Correlation Between Interest Rates

28

5a. Correlation with ROA (All Commercial Banks)

34

5b. Correlation (GDP Growth and FED Funds Rate)

34

6. ROA Model Results – All Commercial Banks

39

7. ROA Model Results – Assets >$1B

49

8. ROA Model Results – Assets $100MM - $1B

50

9. ROA Model Results – Assets <$100MM

51

vii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. David Flynn, and additional
committee members, Dr. Prodosh Simlai and Dr. Daniel Biederman, for their insight and
guidance on completing my thesis. I would also like to thank my instructors from the
Economics Department at UND; I will forever be amazed by the knowledge you all have
and appreciate everything you have taught me during my time in the MSAE program.
Lastly, and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife in supporting me through this
challenge; I am grateful for everything you have done while I pursued my dream.

viii

ABSTRACT
As the Economy continues to recover from the ‘Great Recession’, the Fed is taking
a very cautious approach to increasing interest rates; which have been at historical lows the
past several years. If interest rates are increased too quickly, or by the wrong amount, there
may be negative ramifications on economic activity. With the slow recovery following the
‘Great Recession’, commercial banks in the U.S. have struggled to return bank
performance to pre-recession levels, as the low interest rate environment has had a negative
impact on profitability and overall bank performance (as have changes in regulation). It
cannot be argued that commercial banks will receive a higher return on investment when
interest rates are high; however, interest rates and economic activity are negatively
correlated. So, which is more beneficial to maximizing bank performance in the current
market environment: increasing interest rates or stable economic growth? As shown with
my econometric model, commercial banks in the U.S. have historically benefited greater
from economic growth, in the current market environment, as opposed to an increase in
interest rates. I use time series data on all commercial banks in the U.S. (consolidated), and
an ARIMA model with additional independent variables, to support my conclusions. I also
ran separate regressions based on bank size, and it is found that the performance of ‘large’
commercial banks (>$1B in total assets) benefits greater from economic activity (growth),
when compared to smaller more regionalized banks. To truly maximize bank performance
in the long run, interest rates should be determined based on a supply/demand equilibrium;
which in theory should support stable economic activity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The years 2007-2009 will likely go down in history as the most consequential
financial crises the U.S., and global economy, experienced since the ‘Great Depression’;
this event is known as the ‘Great Recession’. To mitigate the impacts of the ‘Great
Recession’, the U.S. government implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)
to help stabilize the financial system; in total $475B in funds were injected into the
financial system to restart growth, and prevent foreclosure when avoidable. Additionally,
the Fed used monetary easing to help improve conditions in the credit market through
Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP’s) whereby treasury securities were purchased to
manage the supply of bank reserves in an effort to maintain market conditions consistent
with the fed funds target rate (which is the interest rate depository institutions charge to
lend reserves to other depository institutions); to support increased economic activity, the
fed funds target rate was reduced to historical lows, causing interest rates to fall
significantly.

Since the ‘Great Recession’, the U.S. Economy has experienced relatively adequate
economic growth, which has improved and stabilized in recent periods; causing the Fed to
begin changing its stance on monetary policy. My thesis takes an empirical approach to
analyzing the difference between the impact interest rates and economic activity have on
the current performance of commercial banks (in the U.S.); specifically, I am able to show
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that the performance of commercial banks in the U.S. has historically benefited greater
from economic growth, as opposed to an increase in interest rates. The existing literature
lacks discussion around the difference between the impact interest rates and economic
activity (negatively correlated over time) have on the performance of commercial banks,
specifically in the U.S. Furthermore, updated research on estimating financial performance
with an economic model is limited following the ‘Great Recession’ which captures a
significant event within the data. My empirical research focuses on three hypotheses (with
variation expected based on commercial bank ‘Size’):

H1 – Banks should not be so eager to accept an increase in interest rates from the Fed as
the impact on economic activity has historically negatively impacted future bank
performance; this does not suggest that banks should not increase rates consistent with the
Fed, rather banks should be more concerned about stable economic activity as opposed
seeing the Fed increase rates.

H2 – Economic performance plays a more significant role in the current performance of
commercial banks, when compared to increasing interest rate levels – Re-affirmation of
conclusion made by Glen and Mondragon-Velez (2011) for banks in developing countries.

H3 – Based on historical data one could develop an equilibrium between interest rates and
economic activity to maximize bank profitability; this could be done in applying ‘The
Natural Rate of Interest Theory’ (discussed below) whereby economic activity would be
stabilized.
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The results of my empirical research allow me to conclude the following:

1. There is clearly a negative correlation between interest rates and economic activity.
As intended by monetary policy, interest rates are increased to keep inflation in
check; and if rates go up too fast or at the wrong time, economic activity will
slow/contract. The data shows that there is a negative correlation between
increasing the fed funds rate and future economic activity (GDP growth).

2. Bank performance (as measured by ROA) benefits greater from consistent
economic growth, as opposed to increasing interest rates. I do not suggest that
higher interest rates do not provide a higher return; rather I show that current bank
performance is more likely to benefit from consistent economic growth going
forward, as a change in interest rates at the wrong time or by the wrong amount
could send economic activity in the opposite direction.

3. In order to maximize bank profitability, we first need to stabilize economic activity;
reducing the impact changing interest rates has on economic activity. If this could
be done, an equilibrium interest rate could prove to maximize bank profitability in
the long run. I suggest that the use of a ‘Natural Interest Rate’ could be this
equilibrium rate.
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Background:
The fed funds target rate was reduced to a historical low of 0-25 basis points (bps),
where 100 bps is equal to 1%, on December 16, 2008. This target rate was maintained until
December 16, 2015, when the Fed made the decision to increase the target rate to 25-50
bps; one year later, on December 14, 2016, the target rate was again increased by 25 bps,
to 50-75bps. In a press release from the Federal Reserve, dated February 1, 2017, it was
communicated that the fed funds target rate would be maintained at the current level (5075bps); the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) noted that while there has been
improvement in the sentiment of consumers and businesses, household spending remained
moderate and business fixed investments were ‘soft’.

To put the volatility and past levels into perspective, the graph below shows the
historical fed funds target rate. It should be clarified that the target rate was changed to a
target range during the ‘Great Recession’; it should also be noted that periods shaded in
gray indicate a recession. In almost all instances where the fed funds rate is on an increasing
trend, it reaches a peak and is followed by a drop in the target rate and subsequently a
recession. This would explain why the FOMC is taking such a cautious approach to
increasing the rate now; the goal is to maintain inflation of 2% with consistent economic
growth, however, achieving this is not as simple as it sounds.
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Figure 1: Historical Fed Funds Rate with Recession Indications

This could lead one to ask: ‘Why does this all matter? These are historical points
and we need to focus on the future.’ While this is true, we also need to focus on the mistakes
made in the past, to try and avoid repeating history. While the Fed is not all to blame when
a recession occurs, as there are many different factors that go into each instance, changes
to monetary policy have adverse implications for the health of the economy as the general
purpose of monetary policy in the first place is to control inflation and keep economic
growth in check. It cannot be argued that interest rates can only go up from here, as we
are still sitting at historically low levels (unless one were to believe in a negative interest
rate environment); what can be argued is the timing of these increases to ensure we do not
repeat history over and over again.

The FOMC meets eight times throughout the year, and there is speculation by many
that there will be additional increases to the target rate through the remainder of FY ’17
(one of which is anticipated, by the markets, to occur within days of me writing this
statement). Commercial banks have been eagerly awaiting increases in the fed fund target
rate, as this directly impacts interest banks charge to customers; by increasing interest rates,
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banks can capture a larger profit on their depository funded debt (among other things) thus
improving financial performance. However, the purpose of controlling the target rate is to
support economic stability, as increasing the rate too quickly or at the wrong time can send
the economy in the other direction (as we have seen in the past). Specifically, the Fed will
implement monetary easing by reducing interest rates and/or increasing the money supply,
to encourage economic growth; which was done in response to the ‘Great Recession’.
Conversely, the Fed will tighten monetary policy by increasing interest rates and/or
reducing the money supply to slow economic growth and control inflation. As such, by
increasing the target rate it would appear the Fed is changing its stance on monetary policy,
to maintain a stable economy. However, if rates are increased too quickly or at the wrong
time this could lead to a slowdown in economic growth as the result of monetary tightening.

While the performance of commercial banks is directly impacted by interest rate
levels, economic activity also materially impacts profitability, and as discussed in the
literature (Glen and Mondragon-Velez (2011)) has a more significant impact to bank
performance; economic growth leads to increased investment which leads to increased
financing needs, thus allowing banks to grow their lending portfolios, leading to stronger
performance. However, if economic growth slows there will be a decline in investment and
the lending portfolios of banks will contract, negatively impacting performance. So, the
question is, which is more beneficial to the performance of a commercial bank? Higher
interest rates, or higher (stable) economic growth? Obviously the two cannot be maintained
at a consistent ‘high’ level when applying monetary policy, but from the view of a
commercial bank which should be more appealing? This is the question I intend to answer
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through my empirical research. Specifically, I developed a model to estimate bank
performance, using internal and external factors, providing insight to the debate around
current interest rate levels from the viewpoint of commercial banks.

As supported by existing literature (Glen and Mondragon-Velez (2011)), the
performance of financial institutions (commercial banks) tends to follow a pattern like a
business cycle. During periods of economic growth (low interest rates) bank performance
is strong, however as the economy begins to slow (interest rates increase) the performance
of financial institutions begins to decline; this is the result of both a contraction in lending
portfolios and increased credit risk, among other things. Furthermore, during periods of
economic growth, banks tend to make riskier investments to capture additional profit;
however, as the economy moves in the other direction these risky investments can lead to
losses for banks as debtors experience financial struggles in a weakening economy, limiting
their ability to repay debt (increasing defaults).

An article written for the February 9, 2017 issue of the Wall Street Journal, titled
‘Companies Race to Refinance Debt’ notes that the anticipation of a continued increase in
interest rates is fueling perhaps the largest corporate refinance boom in many years.
Specifically, businesses refinanced ~$100B in loans during the month of January ’17,
which per the article is the largest monthly total in nearly a decade; this follows just one
month after the Fed announced its decision to increase the fed funds target rate to 50-75bps.
This is being done by businesses to save on interest expense, as rates are expected to
continue increasing. If businesses are making the decision to refinance debt, it could also
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be assumed that they will likely be cutting back on future investments thus reducing future
lending needs.

Natural Rate of Interest:
An equilibrium interest rate to maximize bank performance is centralized around
‘The Natural Rate of Interest’ originated by Knut Wicksell, a Swedish Economist. The
following discussion is based on an article written by Rosen and Ravier (2014) titled the
‘Natural Rate of Interest Rule’. While ‘The Natural Rate of Interest Theory’ is used to
support an alternative method to monetary policy, to ensure economic stability, based on
my empirical results a similar method would also maximize bank performance in the long
run.

The Federal Reserve was created on December 23, 1913 as a response to financial
instability; their ultimate objective, to utilize monetary policy to maximize employment,
abate inflation and control long-term interest rates. As an alternative to monetary policy,
Wicksell’s monetary equilibrium doctrine (Wicksell, 1898) would theoretically result in
inflation-free economic stability allowing for sustained growth; something the Federal
Reserve has not been able to do successfully since their inception. In following Wicksell’s
theory, interest rates for loanable funds would be determined based on a ‘Natural Interest
Rate’; in applying such a method the money supply, in theory, would be in equilibrium,
whereby supply and demand are equal.
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‘The Natural Rate of Interest’ is defined by Wicksell as an interest rate that is
‘Commodity-Price-Neutral’; rather than being determined by financial markets, the interest
rate is set by means of a supply/demand equilibrium. Thus, long term prices would be
stabilized and savings would be equal to investment; i.e. money supply would be equal to
money demand. To validate this theory, the authors discuss historical data which pre-dates
central banking, and supports the idea of ‘free banking’; however, a truly ‘free banking’
environment never really existed in the U.S. prior to the inception of the Federal Reserve.
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the decisions made by the Federal Reserve in the early
2000’s, the use of monetary policy can be truly toxic to the stability of our economy at the
national level, and even on a global scale. Rather than drastically dropping interest rates in
the early 2000’s in response to a recession, it is argued that using a ‘Natural Rate of Interest’
would have reduced the impact resulting from the ‘Housing Bubble’ (Rosen and Ravier
(2014)); as we would not have experienced the run up in home loans, which led to a
significant increase in home values and further financing beyond true values, thus creating
a bubble.

To be clear, the purpose of my research is not to come up with a ‘Natural Rate of
Interest’, rather I use this theory to show that decisions made by the Federal Reserve are
proven to create instability in the financial system, and there are possibly alternative
theories that could be implemented to create economic stability. Furthermore, this theory
suggests that interest rates could be determined by a supply/demand equilibrium to reduce
volatility in economic activity; thus, eliminating one of the factors that materially impacts
bank performance. As discussed in my review of the literature, Glen and Mondragon-
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Velez (2011) find that economic growth is the primary driver of loan portfolio
performance, while interest rates have second-order effects. As such if interest rates were
determined based on an equilibrium (natural method), resulting in economic stability, the
impacts found in the existing data from volatility in economic activity could be greatly
reduced.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: first, I provide a review of the
existing literature, which also discusses how my research adds additional value (Literature
Review); second, the variable selection process is explained including stylized facts and a
description of the data considered in my analysis (Stylized Facts – Data Summary); third,
the econometric methodology used to empirically analyze my topic is discussed and
justified (Methodology); this is subsequently followed by a detailed discussion around the
results (Results); lastly, this paper concludes by revisiting my hypotheses and providing
closing comments to support my conclusions, which includes guidance to further expand
on my work.
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Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
In the wake of the ‘Great Recession’ economists have had the opportunity to
conduct new empirical research, testing existing theories and prior research, around the
impact the state of the economy has on the performance of financial institutions; or
conversely, how financial institutions can impact the state of the economy. As one would
suspect, the state of the economy plays a crucial role in the performance of financial
institutions; however as evidenced by the ‘Great Recession’, decisions made by financial
institutions can also impact the state of the economy (which would intensify the impact on
financial institution performance). This allows one to conclude that there is circular
causality (two-way) between the performance of financial institutions and the state of the
economy; i.e. variable X causes variable Y, and Y causes X, which causes more Y.

Simply put, the timeline of the ‘Great Recession’ would support this theory. While
the economy was doing well, financial institutions could grow their portfolios through
multiple channels; and as financial portfolios grew, other sectors of the economy benefited
(e.g. the housing market). However, much of this growth included risky behavior which
led to the collapse of the financial industry on a global scale, and drove the economy into
a recession. As the economy collapsed, financial institutions suffered significant losses;
and without bailouts from the United States government, we could still be stuck in a deep
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recession (or depression) today. Whether this was the right call or not is beyond the scope
of this paper, and warrants much more debate.

As previously discussed, my research takes an empirical approach to analyzing and
interpreting the role interest rates and economic activity play in the performance of
commercial banks; specifically, in the U.S. I developed a model to empirically describe
commercial bank performance (at the aggregate level), with my independent variables
including an interest rate variable as well as an economic activity variable (as described in
the Stylized Facts – Data Summary); the purpose of my research is to correlate the state of
the economy (measured by economic activity and interest rate levels) and the performance
of commercial banks (acknowledging the fact that there is circular causality). The existing
literature on this topic varies widely in scope, and includes both new and old research.

As the macro economy goes through business cycles (i.e. booms and busts), the
decisions made by commercial banks, and ultimately their performance, typically follows
a similar pattern. Glen and Mondragon-Velez (2011) studied the effects of business cycles
on the performance of commercial banks in developing countries during the period 19962008. They found that economic growth is the primary driver of loan portfolio
performance, while interest rates have second-order effects; the relationship between credit
quality (loan loss provisioning) and economic growth is also found to be non-linear under
extreme situations; such as a recession or economic boom. The authors also make the same
notion that the relationship between business cycles and bank performance implies a series
of two-way causality; as I had previously mentioned.
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Bucher, Dietrich and Hauck (2013) take a different approach and study the impact
business cycles have on internal and external funding sources of banks; concluding that
macroeconomic policy plays a crucial role in the access to funding and stability of the
financial system. Their research includes discussion of the financial instability hypothesis
of Minsky (1986), which states that during periods of economic growth (prosperity),
speculation and increased borrowing may push the economy to the edge; leading to a
financial crisis (such as the ‘Great Recession’). Bolt et al. (2012) examines bank
profitability in 17 countries during the period 1979-2007 and concludes that bank profits
behave in a pro-cyclical pattern, especially during deep recessions. Bolt et al. (2012) point
out in their research that past lending practices should also be taken into consideration
when analyzing the profitability of a loan portfolio (Net Interest Income); i.e. long term
interest rates in prior years are found to be important determinants of bank performance,
implying that there is a lagged effect.

As indicated by the existing literature, it is conceivable that the state of the economy
plays a crucial role in the performance of commercial banks. The same can be said about
interest rates, however as noted above this has been found to have second-order effects to
economic activity. Stepping aside from bank performance for a moment, the research
conducted by Dotsey (1998) analyzes the predictive power of the yield curve for economic
activity; concluding that the spread between different indexes includes useful predictive
power and that this can be considered a leading indicator of economic activity. This would
support my comments around the fact that interest rates are negatively correlated with
economic activity. The study conducted by Dotsey (1998) was an expansion on a much
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larger empirical analysis completed by Stock and Watson (1989) which attempted to
predict future economic activity based on a large series of macro-economic indicators, one
of which was the spread between the ten year and one year US Treasury Bond.

Taking yet another approach, Delis and Kouretas (2011) studied the Euro Banking
industry during the period 2001-2008 to expand on existing literature that viewed the low
interest rate environment during the early 2000’s as a leading factor that caused banks to
partake in more risky behavior in search for a higher return. They conclude that low interest
rates do in fact increase bank risk taking; this research is an expansion on that conducted
by Keeley (1990) and Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez (2006) which supported the fact that
‘certain exogenous shocks that lead to lower informational asymmetries, trigger intensified
competition and credit expansion, and create incentives for banks to search for higher
yields in more risky projects’ (Delis and Kouretas 2011).

One thing that came out of the ‘Great Recession’ was the Dodd Frank Act, which
greatly changed the regulation of the banking industry. It was expected that this tightening
in bank regulation would limit commercial banks’ ability to take more risky positions
during periods of low interest rates; which would limit bank performance. Gropper, Jahera
Jr. and Park (2015) study the impact political power, economic freedom and Congress have
on the performance of banks. They conclude that bank performance and economic freedom
(which factors in bank regulation) are positively related; less regulation means more
economic freedom. The authors also re-confirm prior research conducted by Gropper et al.
(2013), concluding that political connections and bank performance are positively
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correlated; however, this correlation is found to be less significant when there is more
economic freedom.

In addition to regulatory control, the government can also impact bank profitability
through monetary policy. Mamatzakis and Bermpei (2016) studied the relationship
between unconventional monetary policy (UMP) and the performance of U.S commercial
banks; concluding that UMP has a negative relationship with bank performance. However,
this negative relationship is mitigated for banks in the sample that had high levels of asset
diversification and low deposit funding. The impact UMP has on the performance of
commercial banks is explained in existing literature through two channels: ‘Portfolio
Balance’ and ‘Signaling’. The ‘Portfolio Balance’ channel (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et
al., 2012) uses the notion that the Fed’s large scale asset purchases (monetary policy
method) affect long term interest rates as the amount of long term assets held by the private
sector are reduced. While the ‘Signaling’ channel assumes that monetary policy may signal
to the market that the Fed has changed its stance on policy, which would impact investors’
expectations on short term interest rates. This in turn would affect long term bond yields
through the expected short term rate, which is a function of long term interest rates (Bauer
and Rudebusch, 2013). This volatility in interest rates impacts a bank’s net interest income,
and overall performance.

Jimenez, et al. (2012) took a different approach and looked at the impact monetary
policy has on credit supply, for banks in Spain; more specifically they ask the question
‘does the stance of monetary policy and business cycle fluctuations affect credit supply?’

15

They conclude that higher short term interest rates (lower GDP growth) result in reduced
loan granting, and this impact is stronger for banks with low levels of capital and liquidity.
This further supports my comments that increasing interest rates (reduced economic
growth) would result in a contraction to loan portfolios, negatively impacting future bank
performance. Flannery (1981) further supports this by disproving the assumption that
banks may borrow short and lend long which would negatively impact bank performance
in an increasing rate environment. It is found that the general practice of most commercial
banks is to ‘match fund’ their loans, or utilize derivative financial instruments, to reduce
overall interest rate risk; i.e. banks hedge themselves against interest rate volatility through
‘match funding’ or the use of synthetic securities (financial derivatives).

Up to this point, I have discussed existing literature that covers a wide spectrum of
avenues to analyzing the performance of commercial banks, as well as how different
variables that can explain bank performance interact with each other. A recent MSAE
graduate from the University of North Dakota completed their thesis on a similar topic,
titled ‘Bank Efficiency Ratios – Can they be used to reliably predict future bank
performance?’ (Loebach, 2015). In his review of the literature, Loebach sites several of the
same studies I have discussed herein; the selection of variables for my model to explain
bank profitability uses a similar approach to Loebach (2015) (see Stylized Facts – Data
Summary) however the intent of our research differs greatly. Loebach concludes that while
the efficiency ratio is a statistically significant predictor of bank performance, a better
indicator is a bank’s current return on average assets (ROAA). As such rather than focusing
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on expense reductions to improve the efficiency ratio, it is suggested that banks should
instead focus on revenue enhancement.

Existing literature most closely related to my topic is that completed by
Athanasoglou, Brissmiss and Delis (2008). The purpose of their study was to analyze bankspecific, industry-specific, and macro-economic determinants of bank profitability; for a
panel of Greek banks during the period of 1985-2001. Their research incorporates the
traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis, which states that increased
market power (economies of scale) leads to monopoly type profits; however, no evidence
is found to support this theory. All the bank-specific variables used, with the exception of
bank size, are found to be statistically significant in the model; as such my variable
selection is largely based upon their research (see Stylized Facts – Data Summary). The
authors are also able to conclude that business cycles have a positive effect on bank
performance, however, this effect is found to be asymmetric and only significant at the
extreme points in a business cycle (peak or trough).

In contrast to Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Smirlock (1985) and Pasiouras and
Kosmidou (2007) can show that size is statistically significant (and positive) when trying
to explain bank profitability. As such to incorporate size into my empirical research I have
broken the banking industry down by size (three sub-groups), as detailed below in the
Methodology section.

17

While there is an abundance of supplementary literature for this topic, this literature
review has provided a solid foundation for what has been completed thus far; and is
inclusive of those articles that most closely relate to the purpose of my research. To build
on this, I am adding to the existing literature in the following ways: First, I will be focusing
on banks in the U.S. pre, during and post ‘Great Recession’; I was not able to find any
existing literature that had taken this approach, to date. Second, my empirical research
takes a close look at the comparison of how interest rates and economic activity impact
bank performance; I was not able to find a study focusing on this comparison with current
U.S. data. Third, my study on bank performance is focused on the aggregate level, which
provides guidance to the commercial banking industry; since we cannot change economic
activity or interest rates for each individual bank. Lastly, in adding to the literature I will
be attempting to support the fact that we could potentially set an equilibrium interest rate
to maximize bank profitability; this would be an expansion on the ‘Natural Rate of Interest
Theory’, through an empirical approach.
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CHAPTER III
STYLIZED FACTS - DATA SUMMARY
The time-series dataset used for my econometric analysis is compiled from various
sources. Specifically, U.S. commercial bank data was gathered from Call Reports through
the FDIC website; every commercial bank in the U.S. that is insured by the FDIC is
required to submit quarterly Call Reports under their regulation requirements. The sample
includes all commercial banks (on a consolidated basis) in the U.S., that are regulated by
the FDIC, for the period 1992-2016; it should be noted that the dataset only includes annual
data (fourth quarter) up until 2001. By measuring on a quarterly basis, as opposed to YTD,
I can effectively capture the variance in bank performance from quarter to quarter, whereas
YTD would not work appropriately as it would be a compilation of performance throughout
the year.

In choosing to stick with consolidated bank data my results show the impact interest
rates and economic growth have on the entire commercial banking system in the U.S.,
which is the intent of my research; I am not trying to show the impact on an individual
basis. The macro-economic data was gathered from the Federal Reserve Economic Data
(FRED) – St. Louis website, for the same periods noted above. Lastly, the Economic
Freedom Summary Index is from freetheworld.com; this same index was used in prior
research conducted by Gropper, Jahera Jr. and Park (2015). As previously noted, the
selection of the dependent and independent variables is based primarily on prior research
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that attempted to explain bank performance. The most influential paper on the selection of
variables used in my model is Athanasoglou et al. (2008).

Table
Variable
List
Table 1: 1:
Variable
List
Variable

Description

Expected
Coefficient Sign

Dependent Variables:
Return on Assets (ROA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Net Interest Margin (NIM)

Return on Avg. Earning Assets measured in bps
Return on Equity measured in bps
Net Interest Margin measured in bps

Independent Variables:
Bank Specific Variables
Capital Ratio (Cap)
Credit Risk Ratio (Cred)
Efficiency Ratio (Effic)
Liquidity Ratio (Liq)
Loan Deposit Ratio (LDR)

Equity to Total Assets Ratio measured in bps
Loss Allowance to Total Loans measured in bps
Bank Efficiency Ratio measured in bps
Bank liquidity Risk measured in bps
Total Loans to Total Deposits measured in bps

?
Depends
?
+

Macro Economic Variables
GDP Growth Quarterly (GDP)
Inflation Quarterly (Inf)
Effective Fed Funds Rate (FFR)
1 Mo. LIBOR (LIBOR)
Prime Rate (PR)
Unemployment Rate (Unemp)

Quarterly GDP Growth measured in bps
Quarterly Inflation measured in bps
Effective Fed Funds Rate measured in bps
1 Mo. London InterBank Offered Rate measured in bps
Fed Prime Rate measured in bps
National Unemployment Rate (Seasonally Adj.) measured in bps

+
?
+
+
+
-

Dummy Variables
Recession Indicator (RecDum)
Senate (Sen)
House (Hou)
President (Pres)

= 1 recession, = 0 no recession
= 1 Republican Control, = 0 Democrat Control
= 1 Republican Control, = 0 Democrat Control
= 1 Republican Control, = 0 Democrat Control

+
+
+

Index measuring Economic Freedom, factoring in Regulation

+

Other
Economic Freedom Index (EFI)
*Notations are in Parenthesis

Table 1 above includes the primary variables (dependent and independent)
considered in my econometric model. It should be noted that not every variable is included
in every regression due to issues with multi-collinearity; nor are my final model results
discussed below all-inclusive of the variables noted above. Specifically, I found that some
of the independent variables were statistically insignificant, and by removing them it did
not materially change my overall results. To provide consistent measurement of my
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coefficient estimates, all ratios and percentages have been converted into basis points (bps);
where 100 bps is equal to 1%. In the banking world one would not typically report an
efficiency ratio, for example, in bps format however for the purposes of my analysis it is
necessary for consistent measurement across my bank specific and macro-economic
variables. Table 1 above also shows the expected coefficient sign for each of my
independent variables, which I further detail below.

Dependent Variables:
Consistent with the research of Athanasoglou et al. (2008), return on assets (ROA
= Net Profits/Average Earning Assets) is used as my key dependent variable of interest, to
measure bank performance; while I also considered return on equity (ROE = Net
Profits/Equity) and net interest margin (NIM = Net Interest Income/Average Earning
Assets) as these are common measures of bank performance. However, as noted by
Athanasoglou et al. (2008) ROE is a measure of financial leverage, thus, banks that hold a
higher leverage position tend to report a higher ROA but lower ROE. Additionally, banks
are required to maintain certain levels of capital by their regulators, which has varied over
the years as regulations change. Because ROE does not capture the risk of higher leverage,
and the ratio can be impacted by changes in bank regulation I have decided to follow the
same approach as Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and use ROA as my key dependent variable
to measure bank performance.
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The rationale behind including NIM to measure bank performance is supported by
the fact that this ratio is heavily influenced by interest rate levels; however, I found the
independent variables in my model to be less statistically significant when using NIM as
the dependent variable; as a result, my error was much larger. Thus, ROA remains the
primary dependent variable of interest to measure bank performance.

In using financial ratios instead of a bottom line income number one can measure
performance consistently over time and compare to prior years on a level playing field, as
these three ratios adjust for changes in assets and equity over time; whereas a bottom line
income number would not be a consistent measurement over time (i.e. does not adjust for
size). Table 2 below lists the sample summary statistics for the dependent variables
considered in my research (all U.S. commercial banks consolidated): ROA has a mean of
0.98% ranging between -0.96% and 1.42% and a standard deviation of 0.46%; ROE has a
mean of 9.86% ranging between -10.15% and 15.53% and a standard deviation of 5.02%;
and NIM has a mean of 3.60% ranging between 2.99% and 4.55% and a standard deviation
of 0.38%.

Table2:
2:Dependent
DependentVariables
VariablesSummary
SummaryStatistics
Statistics
Table
Dependent Variables
Mean
Std. Dev.
Return on Assets (ROA)
Return on Equity (ROE)
Net Interest Margin (NIM)

97.58
986.22
360.35

45.91
502.49
38.22

Min
-96
-1015
299

Max
142
1553
455

* Recall, Table 2 reports the ratios in bps format and as such one simply divides by 100 to get the percentage, as traditionally
reported.
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Independent Variables:
The independent variables used in my analysis are based primarily on the work of
Athanasoglou et al. (2008); the sample period for all variables of interest is 1992-2016. As
discussed in my Literature Review, the research conducted by Athanasoglou et al. (2008)
took an empirical approach to measuring bank profitability (performance) using bankspecific, industry specific and macro-economic determinants. However, our research
differs in a few ways: first, I am looking at commercial banks in the U.S. on a consolidated
basis; second, I am trying to differentiate between the impact interest rates and economic
activity have on bank performance; and lastly, I use my results to support an equilibrium
interest rate based on ‘The Natural Rate of Interest’ theory. I have also added a few
additional independent variables, consistent with prior research, to try and avoid omitted
variable bias.

The bank specific variables selected are a combination of five ratios that are
intended to capture the primary drivers of bank performance, internally; while the macroeconomic variables capture my primary independent variables of interest (economic
activity and interest rates); as well as the unemployment rate. It is recognized that multicollinearity exists between some of these variables and as such when running my actual
regressions, I try not to include redundant variables (i.e. one of the three interest rates is
used in the final model). Table 3 below includes the sample summary statistics for my
independent variables considered (all U.S. commercial banks consolidated); it should be
noted that the actual regressions include lags and differences to account for delayed effects
and the tendency of some variables to persist over time (see Methodology section).
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Table
3: Independent
Variables
Table 3: Independent
Variables Summary
Statistics Summary Statistics
Independent Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

1013.49
194.86
5911.28
3075.67
7985.91

107.63
66.12
311.37
635.02
806.86

751.00
115.00
5268.00
2355.07
6817.00

1134.00
369.00
6662.00
4087.83
8992.00

Macro Economic Variables
GDP Growth Quarterly (GDP)
Inflation Quarterly (Inf)
Effective Fed Funds Rate (FFR)
1 Mo. LIBOR (LIBOR)
Prime Rate (PR)
Unemployment Rate (Unemp)

86.76
0.78
183.32
199.40
489.54
629.71

125.52
0.92
203.31
205.45
198.17
169.51

-211.52
-2.29
7.00
15.15
325.00
400.00

480.52
3.41
581.00
605.75
883.00
990.00

Dummy Variables
Recession Indicator (RecDum)
Senate (Sen)
House (Hou)
President (Pres)

0.12
0.43
0.72
0.43

0.32
0.50
0.45
0.50

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

Other
Economic Freedom Index (EFI)

8.08

0.31

7.68

8.65

Bank Specific Variables
Capital Ratio (Cap)
Credit Risk Ratio (Cred)
Efficiency Ratio (Effic)
Liquidity Ratio (Liq)
Loan Deposit Ratio (LDR)

*Recall, Table 3 reports the ratios in bps format and as such one simply divides by 100 to get the
percentage, as traditionally reported for each of the ratios above; interest rates are commonly reported
as bps.

Bank Specific Variables:
The capital ratio is a measure of total equity to total assets for a specific period
(quarterly). This is a measure of bank capitalization or conversely bank leverage; e.g. a
higher ratio would indicate higher capitalization whereas a lower ratio would indicate
higher leverage. By including a capital measure, I can capture bank leverage which has
been known to be a key factor in bank performance. However, the expected sign of this coefficient is inconclusive without additional analysis, since excessive levels of owner equity
could indicate that capital is not being used at its full capacity which would result in lower
profits, or higher leverage would result in increased costs which would also reduce bank
profitability; thus there is likely a balance of leverage and capitalization that is most ideal
and the coefficient estimate will be dependent on how close actual levels are to this balance.
As previously noted, capital levels are also influenced by bank regulators, and as such
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holding excess capital above regulatory requirements is at the discretion of each individual
commercial bank; my measure of capital shows the capitalization for all commercial banks
in the U.S., consolidated. The mean capital ratio for my sample is 10.14% with a range of
7.51% to 11.34% and a standard deviation of 1.08%.

Credit risk is a measure of anticipated losses based on the existing loan portfolio
and current economic conditions. This ratio is measured as the bank’s allowance for loans
and lease losses (ALLL) divided by total loans. A bank that uses effective risk management
uses a series of algorithms and risk ratings to predict the probability of default and loss
given default for each specific loan. Based on the results, a provision (income statement
expense) for loan losses is made to the ALLL account (contra-asset account on the balance
sheet netted against total loans) to help mitigate any risk for potential losses in the portfolio.
A higher ratio would indicate higher credit risk, while a lower ratio would indicate lower
credit risk. Credit risk and provisions to the ALLL account directly impact the income
statement and balance sheet, and thus overall bank performance. As such the expected sign
of this coefficient is negative for ROA and ROE, however higher credit risk should imply
higher return (higher interest rates) to compensate for the additional risk and thus the
coefficient estimate for the NIM model is expected to be positive. The mean credit risk
ratio for my sample is 1.95% with a range of 1.15% to 3.69% and a standard deviation of
0.66%.
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As concluded by the work of Loebach (2015), a banks efficiency ratio is found to
be a useful indicator of bank performance; specifically, future bank performance. As such
I have included the efficiency ratio in my list of independent variables. This ratio
effectively captures the non-interest expenses (overhead expenses) of a bank in relation to
total revenue (interest income plus non-interest income); thus, it is a measure of how much
it costs the bank (overhead expense) to generate $1.00 in revenue. It is the goal of every
bank to maintain a low efficiency ratio; as a rule of thumb, it is considered adequate if the
efficiency ratio is below 50% (i.e. for every $0.50 of overhead, the bank generates $1.00
in revenue). By including the efficiency ratio in my independent variables, I can capture
the cost side of bank performance as well as business efficiency; the coefficient estimate
for the efficiency ratio is expected to be negative. The mean efficiency ratio for my sample
is 59.11% with a range of 52.68% to 66.62% and a standard deviation of 3.11%.

An additional measure that has been found to be an important determinant of bank
performance is the liquidity ratio. This is a measurement of the banks liquid assets (net
cash, net securities, and net fed funds sold and reverse purchases) divided by total
liabilities. The rationale in including a liquidity measure is based on the fact that banks
with low liquidity are at a higher risk for adverse bank performance, especially in an
economic downturn; however, like the capital position as discussed above, banks could
also hold excessive liquidity resulting in the potential of lost profits. Thus, the expected
sign of this coefficient is inconclusive without additional analysis. The mean liquidity ratio
for my sample is 30.76% with a range of 23.55% to 40.88% and a standard deviation of
6.35%.
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The last of the bank-specific independent variables to be discussed is the loans to
deposits ratio; this is a measure of total loans divided by total deposits. Because a bank
generates the most interest income on its deposit funded loans, as they can capture a larger
spread, it is expected that a higher ratio would result in better bank performance; as such
the coefficient estimate is expected to be positive. This ratio was selected as an alternative
measure for liquidity, however it was found that the liquidity ratio was more statistically
significant in the model; I did not include both in the final model as these two variables are
highly positively correlated with one another. The mean loans to deposits ratio for my
sample is 79.86% with a range of 68.17% to 89.92% and a standard deviation of 8.07%.

Macro-Economic Variables:
As a measure of economic activity, I use the quarterly change in real gross domestic
product (seasonally adjusted); this variable is labeled GDP growth. Not only is GDP a key
variable used in other bank performance research, it is also one of the key measures used
by economists when discussing the health of the economy and current economic activity.
A positive change in GDP would mean economic growth, which is expected to positively
impact bank performance. The mean GDP growth rate for my sample is 0.87% with a range
of -2.12% to 4.81% and a standard deviation of 1.26%. Table 3 also includes an inflation
variable; however, this was not found to be as statistically significant in the models, and
GDP growth was more closely correlated with bank performance.
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The next macro-economic variable is a measure of interest rates. As shown in Table
3 I have included three different interest rates: Effective Fed Funds Rate; 1 Mo. LIBOR;
and Prime Rate. It is only necessary to include one in the final model, and I have decided
to stick with the Effective Fed Funds Rate. While prior literature includes the use of
different interest rates, including the Effective Fed Funds Rate, I find this interest rate to
be most relevant for the purposes of my analysis as this is the rate that is controlled by
monetary policy; the other interest rate indexes are highly correlated with changes in the
Effective Fed Funds Rate (Table 4), however there is typically a lag period between
changes in the other indexes. By including the Effective Fed Funds Rate in my model, I
can capture the initial decision of the Fed to change interest rates. The mean Effective Fed
Funds Rate for my sample is 1.83% with a range of 0.07% to 5.81% and a standard
deviation of 2.03%.

Table 4: Correlation between Interest Rates
Effective Fed Funds Rate Prime Rate

Effective Fed Funds Rate
Prime Rate
1 Mo. LIBOR

0.9992
0.9943

0.996

In addition to my two key macro-economic variables of interest I also include the
national unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted. This is to capture additional variance in
the data due to changes in the macro-economy. While GDP growth, interest rates and
unemployment are all correlated in some way, by including the unemployment rate I can
explain more of the variance in the data; the coefficient estimate for this variable is
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expected to be negative as a higher unemployment rate typically implies weakness in the
macro-economy. The average unemployment rate during my sample period was 6.29%
with a range of 4.00% to 9.90%, and a standard deviation of 1.70%.

Dummy/Other Variables:
To capture the effect of business cycles on bank performance I use a dummy
variable to indicate periods of a recession. As confirmed by the research of others
(discussed above) business cycles are found to have a significant impact on bank
performance. Specifically, during periods of economic growth, banks can grow their loan
portfolio and invest in riskier assets, however as the economy turns in the other direction
loan portfolios tend to contract and credit risk increases, resulting in weaker bank
performance. As with many of the variables included there is likely a lag in the effect a
recession has on bank performance; this is factored into my model as discussed in the
Methodology section below. On average, the U.S. was in a recession 12% of the time during
my sample period.

As confirmed by Gropper, Jahera Jr. and Park (2015) politics can also play a factor
in bank performance; specifically, politicians with a Republican agenda are more likely to
loosen regulation and promote economic freedom, while democrats tend to follow an
agenda in opposition to these views. Thus, it would be expected that in a Republican
controlled government (majority Republican), bank performance would improve;
assuming there would be changes in bank regulation and the freedom of businesses. When
setting up the model I only found House control to be statistically significant; as such the
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other two political variables are not included in the final model. Lastly, I also include the
Economic Freedom Index used by Gropper, Jahera Jr. and Park (2015) to measure changes
in economic freedom over time; this includes regulation, among other things. In
interpreting the index, a higher number implies looser business policy and less regulation
(i.e. more economic freedom).

In this section I have discussed my data sample for all commercial banks in the
U.S., that are insured by the FDIC; in addition to the rationale behind my variable selection.
As noted in the Methodology section below, my regression analysis also breaks up the
commercial banking industry by size (Total Assets). In doing so I can show how the
coefficient estimates for my independent variables differ based on bank size. It is
anticipated that bank size will make a difference, however the overall conclusions are
expected to remain consistent.
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CHAPRTER IV
METHODOLOGY
As noted, I have compiled a time series dataset which includes both seasonal and
non-seasonal factors; there are also time dependent disturbances in the data that would not
be captured with a standard regression model. Prior literature (Athanasoglou et al. (2008))
indicates that when panel data are used for the purposes of measuring bank performance,
it is appropriate to include time fixed effects. While my data is strictly time-series, there
are still time dependent disturbances in the data, thus, I have chosen to use an
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) model; which includes the use of
additional independent variables beyond my dependent variable of interest (ROA to
measure bank performance). Traditional ARIMA models are used to fit a univariate model
with time dependent disturbances; however, I also want to provide coefficient estimates
for additional independent variables important to my analysis, as detailed in the Stylized
Fact – Data Summary. While this is outside the norm for a traditional ARIMA model, it is
still common practice to fit an ARIMA model with additional independent variables.

To develop my model, I started by determining the appropriate auto-regressive and
moving average orders. In doing so I looked at the auto-correlation and partial autocorrelation of my dependent variable (ROA for the purposes of this discussion). The results
suggested that the auto-regressive order should be set with three lags, and the moving
average order should be set with four lags, as these periods are all outside of the 95 percent
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confidence band of no correlation; my model is AR (1/3) MA (1/4) (see Appendix A Auto-Correlation and Partial Auto-Correlation). As such my model integrates ROA into
the independent variables by auto-regressing lags one through three and applying a moving
average of periods one through four.

The next step in developing my model was to identify the variables that were nonstationary over time (dickey-fuller test), and adjust using the first difference method. All
bank independent variables were converted to first differences, to ensure they were
stationary over time; thus, my model estimates for the bank independent variables measures
the effects of the variance in changes over time. My economic activity variable of interest,
GDP growth, is already considered to be a first difference as it is the change in real GDP
from one period to the next; thus, I am able reject the null hypothesis and conclude that
this variable is stationary over time.

With my interest rate variable, the Fed Funds Rate, I am unable to reject the null
indicating that the variable is non-stationary over time; this can be explained by the fact
that interest rates have been very volatile over my sample time-period and have been at
historical lows the past several years. However, for the purposes of this analysis I want to
capture actual interest rate levels, not just changes in interest rates and as such I
acknowledge the fact that my interest rate variable is non-stationary and make no further
adjustment. To support my overall conclusion, I did run a separate model to include the
first difference of the Fed Funds Rate as an independent variable and my final results hold
true; however, to explain the results with respect to my overall research intent, it makes
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more sense when I include the actual Fed Funds Rate. The other independent variables
included in my final model (unemployment rate, Economic Freedom Index) as well as my
dummy/indicator variables (House control and recession) do not warrant further
adjustment as it was confirmed that these variables are in fact stationary over time; i.e. I
can reject the null hypothesis that a unit-root exists.

With my data adjusted as appropriate for an ARIMA model, my final step was to
determine the lags, if necessary, for each of my independent variables. In doing so I started
with models limited to only bank data, bank data and GDP growth, bank data and the Fed
Funds Rate, and then integrated my additional variables of interest. To further determine
the appropriate lags for my GDP growth and Fed Funds Rate variables, I looked at the
correlation between these two variables, with ROA, to determine the set-up of my model.
As shown in Table 5a below, ROA has a positive correlation with the Fed Funds Rate up
to the 4th lag, however the correlation becomes increasingly more negative beginning with
the 5th lag. On the other hand, GDP growth has a positive correlation with ROA that is
diminishing over-time; nonetheless remains strong (compared to the correlation between
the Fed Funds Rate and ROA) through the 6th period. Thus, stable and recurring economic
growth should provide banks with consistently improving bank profitability; however,
regarding interest rates, the impact is positive in the beginning but the data would suggest
that this effect becomes negative over time; likely due to the impact increasing interest
rates have on GDP growth (as detailed in Table 5b).
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Table 5a: Correlation with ROA (All Commercial Banks)
Correlation: ROA
Fed Funds Rate
--.
0.3868
L1.
0.3116
L2.
0.2244
L3.
0.1553
L4.
0.0559
L5.
-0.0498
L6.
-0.1498

GDP Growth
--.
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.
L6.

0.4489
0.4568
0.4355
0.4121
0.4689
0.4082
0.4031

Table 5b: Correlation (GDP Growth and Fed Funds Rate)
Correlation
GDP Growth
Fed Funds Rate

Fed Funds Rate
--.
0.2881
L1.
0.2058
L2.
0.1522
L3.
0.0824
L4.
0.0058
L5.
-0.0236
L6.
-0.1158

GDP Growth
--.
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
L5.
L6.

0.1531
0.2812
0.2839
0.2757
0.2718
0.2173
0.2381

Based on these results I included the 1st lag (t-1) and 6th lag (t-6) for both GDP
growth and the Fed Funds Rate in my models; in doing so I capture the initial positive
impact of both, and then the diminishing impact for GDP growth and negative impact for
the Fed Funds Rate in prior periods. I also include the square of GDP growth and the Fed
Funds Rate, with the same respective lags, to show that the model is in fact non-linear; i.e.
diminishing marginal return or loss. The following models were found to provide the most
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consistent results with the lowest margin of error based on a one step ahead forecast. I used
the robust standard errors option to account for the risk of heteroscedasticity.

Model 1 - GDP Model:
!" = $ + &'() *"+, + &'-./ *" + &.001' *"+, + &213 *"+, + &456 *"+, + &456 *"+7 + &4568 *"+, + &4568 *"+7
2

2
&2 *"+,
+ 9"

+
"

Model 2 - Interest Rate Model:
!" = $ + &'() *"+, + &'-./ *" + &.001' *"+, + &213 *"+, + &::; *"+, + &::; *"+7 + &::;8 *"+, + &::;8 *"+7
2

2
&2 *"+,
+ 9"

+
"

Model 3 - Combined Model:
!" = $ + &'() *"+, + &'-./ *" + &.001' *"+, + &213 *"+, + &456 *"+, + &456 *"+7 + &4568 *"+, + &4568 *"+7
2

2
&2 *"+,
+ 9"

+ &::; *"+, + &::; *"+7 + &::;8 *"+, + &::;8 *"+7 +
"

The bank independent variables of interest are the change in the capital ratio (cap)
lagged one period (t-1), the change in credit risk (cred) for the current period (t), the change
in the efficiency ratio (effic) lagged one period (t-1) and the change in the liquidity ratio
(liq) lagged one period (t-1). Model 1 only integrates GDP growth (GDP) for periods t-1
and t-6, while excluding the Fed Funds Rate (FFR); conversely Model 2 integrates the Fed
Funds Rate for periods t-1 and t-6 while excluding GDP growth. Then I tie everything
together and include both independent variables of interest in Model 3. Recall, GDP2 and
FFR2 are included in the models to show that my independent variables of interest are nonlinear in the model. The remaining independent variables (l) included in my models are the
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first period lag (t-1) of the recession dummy variable, unemployment rate, House control
indicator variable and Economic Freedom Index.

In addition to running these Models on my full data set (i.e. all commercial banks
in the U.S.), I break commercial banks down by size (generating separate data sets) and rerun my Models. Specifically, I use total assets and break the data into three sub-groups:
Commercial Banks >$1B; Commercial Banks $100MM - $1B; and Commercial Banks
<$100MM. In doing so I can show how bank size plays a factor in the overall results; this
is explained in further detail below.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS
The results of my ARIMA Models for all commercial banks in the U.S. are detailed
in Table 6 below. With regards to Model 1, where only GDP growth was factored into the
model, it is shown that both lagged periods (t-1 and t-6) included are statistically significant
at the 1% confidence level; the same holds for the square of these variables supporting the
fact that GDP growth has diminishing marginal returns (i.e. the relationship is non-linear)
with respect to bank performance. The results of Model 1 would suggest that GDP growth
of 25bps or 0.25% in the prior period (t-1) would support increased ROA of 4bps or 0.04%;
however, this effect becomes negative in the sixth period suggesting that GDP growth of
25bps or 0.25% in period t-6 would result in a 2bps or 0.02% decline in ROA. This is likely
attributed to that fact that volatility in GDP growth has occurred throughout the time-period
selected; which includes two (one very significant) recessions. Although the GDP growth
in period t-6 would indicate a slight decline in ROA, the results would suggest that stable
and consistent GDP growth over-time would result in consistently increasing ROA.

Switching the analysis over to interest rates, Model 2 integrates the Fed Funds Rate
as an independent variable; and excludes GDP growth. As detailed in Table 6, it is shown
that the Fed Funds Rate for period t-1 is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level,
while period t-6 is statistically significant at the 1% confidence level; the Fed Funds Rate
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squared for these respective periods is statistically significant at the 5% confidence level
(supporting a non-linear relationship). Based on the output, a 25bps or 0.25% increase in
the Fed Funds Rate in period t-1 would support a 6.53bps or 0.063% increase in ROA;
which is stronger than the impact GDP growth had on ROA for the prior period (as
previously discussed). However, when a 25bps or 0.25% increase in the Fed Funds Rate is
factored into period t-6, the returns in period t-1 are almost completely offset (and the
negative impact in period t-6 is more statistically significant in the model). Furthermore, it
is possible to have consistent GDP growth over time (if stable), however consistent
increases in the Fed Funds Rate over time would negatively impact GDP growth and likely
lead to a recession; which would materially impact ROA in a negative way.

Model 3 integrates both GDP growth and the Fed Funds Rate, with the same
respective lags and squared versions of the variables. The results detailed in Table 6
indicate that GDP growth and GDP growth squared are statistically significant at the 1%
level for both periods t-1 and t-6; however, the Fed Funds Rate and Fed Funds Rate squared
variables become non-statistically significant, as the coefficient estimates are greatly
reduced when factoring in GDP growth. Specifically, based on the results from Model 3 it
is shown that 25bps or 0.25% GDP growth in period t-1 would support a 3.88bps or
0.0388% increase in ROA; while the same level of GDP growth in period t-6 would lead
to a 1.81bps or 0.0181% decline in ROA. Conversely the coefficient estimates for the Fed
Funds Rate would indicate that the overall impact to ROA from changes in interest rates
are rather marginal; and not statistically significant.
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Table 6: ROA Model Results - All Commercial Banks
Dependent Variable:
ROAbps

Capital Difference
L1.
Credit Risk Difference

Model 1
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0024
-1.8190

Model 2
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0903

0.2256

0.1437 **

-1.0091

0.1925

Model 3
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0357

0.5824 *

-1.7200

0.0883
0.1344 ***

Efficiency Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0096

0.0066

0.0259

0.0073 ***

0.0075

0.0069

Liqudidty Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0225

0.0305

0.0060

0.0334

0.0272

0.0293

GDP Growth bps
L1.
L6.

0.1621
-0.0831

0.0345 ***
0.0223 ***

0.1553
-0.0722

0.0273 ***
0.0190 ***

GDP Growth bps sq.
L1.
L6.

-0.0005
0.0002

0.0001 ***
0.0000 ***

-0.0005
0.0002

0.0001 ***
0.0000 ***

0.0413
0.0421

Fed Funds Rate bps
L1.
L6.

0.2612
-0.2048

0.1078 **
0.0769 ***

0.0382
-0.0611

Fed Funds Rate bps sq
L1.
L6.

-0.0004
0.0003

0.0001 **
0.0001 **

0.0000
0.0001

0.0001
0.0001 *

Recession (Dummy)
L1.

-16.8920

4.5648 ***

-30.5475

12.8483 **

-20.9104

4.9208 ***

Unemployment bps
L1.

-0.0947

0.0151 ***

-0.0405

0.0234 *

-0.0756

0.0150 ***

House Control
L1.

21.9456

3.9034 ***

30.8942

11.6177 ***

24.2775

4.4355 ***

Economic Freedom
L1

49.3227

6.2114 ***

34.3718

19.0598 *

48.7676

8.0394 ***

-257.4029

54.1961 ***

-179.2658

-267.6946

61.4145 ***

-1.0112
-0.8810
-0.7734

0.1149 ***
0.1394 ***
0.1287 ***

-0.6448
-0.3953
-0.5256

-1.0278
-0.9118
-0.7867

0.1115 ***
0.1258 ***
0.1222 ***

Constant
ARMA
ar
L1.
L2.
L3.
ma
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.

0.7777
0.8735
1.0241
0.5004

0.2189
0.0842
0.1544
0.1828

***
***
***
***

1.1537
0.6410
1.1537
1.0000

/sigma

9.1361

0.7342 ***

11.8434

*1% Significance Level **5% Significance Level ***10% Significance Level
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140.8911

0.2287 ***
0.3418
0.1605 ***

0.1156
0.3554
0.1156
0.0000

***
*
***
***

0.6993
0.8558
0.9746
0.4371

0.2321
0.0984
0.1840
0.1842

***
***
***
**

1.3717 ***

8.6243

0.6223 ***

Model 3 results are generally consistent to Model 1 results, with regards to GDP
growth; however, Model 3 and Model 2, when comparing the effect of changes in the Fed
Funds Rate, vary greatly. These results are consistent to my overall hypothesis in that bank
performance (ROA) benefits more from consistent GDP growth when compared to
increasing interest rates (based on historical data).

While my hypotheses are supported using a data set with all commercial banks, it
is found that the results vary based on bank size. As noted in the Methodology section, I
gathered additional time-series data sets for different sub-groups of commercial banks in
the U.S. based on bank asset size (these results are found in Tables 7-9 in Appendix B). I
first look at what I define as ‘large’ banks; banks with >$1B in assets. This is purely a
subjective definition of ‘large’ banks as there is significant variation between asset size for
banks in this sub-group; nonetheless I can support my conclusions using this benchmark
for ‘large’ banks. The sub-group for ‘medium’ sized banks is defined as banks with assets
between $100MM and $1B; and the sub-group for ‘small’ banks is defined as assets
<$100MM.

As detailed in Table 7 (Appendix B) the results for the ‘large’ bank sub-group are
generally consistent with my overall results, previously discussed. However, it is found
that the Fed Funds Rate is not statistically significant to either Model 2 nor Model 3; while
the coefficient estimates are comparable. Thus, my conclusions hold for ‘large’ banks;
conversely, with respect to the ‘medium’ and ‘small’ banks, the coefficient estimates are
materially different, and the statistical significance of my independent variables of interest
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is diminished. This would be expected for smaller, more regionalized banks. Specifically,
economic activity at the national level would be expected to impact ‘large’ commercial
banks that have a wider geographical footprint. While smaller more regionalized banks
would be impacted by local economic activity, which can vary compared to economic
activity at the national level. Furthermore, competition from ‘large’ commercial banks has
a material impact on ROA for smaller banks; while large banks can provide favorable
rates/deals and still generate adequate return through economies of scale, it is more difficult
for smaller banks to do the same; the number of ‘large’ banks has been consistently
increasing over time.

Using a one step ahead forecast, I generated a predicted value for ROA and took
the difference from my predicted ROA and actual ROA to generate my model error. The
graphs below show the error results for Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively for all commercial
banks (All); the errors for each of the three subgroups were generally consistent. As
suggested by these graphs, the largest prediction error occurs during the ‘Great Recession’;
with so many other factors impacting bank performance during this period it becomes more
difficult to predict ROA. Nonetheless my one step ahead forecast is within 20bps or 0.2%.
The error for each model has an approximate mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 10bps
or 0.1%; and all three are approximately normally distributed. Additionally, the errors for
each respective model were verified as white-noise (white-noise test).

41

-20

ROA Error Model 1
-10
0

10

20

Figure 2: Model 1 Error (All)

2000q1

2005q1

2010q1

2015q1

Time

-40

ROA Error Model 2
-20
0

20

40

Figure 3: Model 2 Error (All)

2000q1

2005q1

2010q1

2015q1

Time

-20

-10

ROA Error Model 3
0
10

20

Figure 4: Model 3 Error (All)

2000q1

2005q1

2010q1
Time

42

2015q1

Going one step further, I re-ran all three models against the data set of all
commercial banks and included my error terms in each respective regression. It was found
that the co-efficient estimates for my independent variables of interest remained consistent
with the initial models; and my new error was greatly reduced. This alternative approach
to estimating my models further confirms that my results hold true.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
As confirmed by my econometric model results, commercial banks (specifically
those with assets >$1B) should be more concerned about economic activity and growth, as
opposed to increasing interest rates, with respect to improving bank performance in the
current market (as measured by ROA for the purposes of this paper). To be clear, I am not
arguing the case that interest rates need to go up, as they are at historic lows and keeping
them at these low levels could result in inflation above the target rate; nor am I suggesting
that higher interest rates do not provide higher returns. What I am suggesting is that the
current performance of commercial banks benefits more from stable and consistent
economic growth as opposed to changes in interest rates, based on historical data. This is
largely due to the fact that increasing (or decreasing) interest rates at the wrong time or by
the wrong amount can lead to drastic shifts in economic activity. While increasing rates
will allow banks to capture a higher return on bank owned assets, the negative impact on
economic activity is likely to offset these returns and reduce bank performance, over time.

So, the question remains, how does one go about setting an equilibrium between
interest rates and economic activity to maximize bank profitability in the long run? I would
suggest that using an approach like the ‘Natural Rate of Interest Theory’ would allow banks
to maximize profitability in the long run, while also providing the economy with stable and
consistent growth over time. By reducing the impact mechanically changing interest rates
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has on economic activity, using a natural approach and letting a supply/demand equilibrium
determine interest rates would in theory stabilize economic activity and allow banks to
continue growing their loan portfolios in a stable environment. Using this approach would
not eliminate the risk of a recession, as there would still be business cycles like we see
today. However, the significance of recessions, or swings in economic activity would be
greatly reduced, according to this theory. At the very least it warrants additional
consideration, as the Fed has been unable to show that monetary policy can be used to
control economic activity effectively.

To conclude, I have shown that economic activity as measured by GDP growth is
more beneficial to improving the current performance of commercial banks, as opposed to
increasing interest rates. As noted I am not suggesting that higher interest rates do not
improve bank performance, nor am I suggesting that banks can maximize profitability in a
low rate environment; rather I point out that over time economic growth has shown to be
more beneficial to improving bank performance. If one could find a way to stabilize
economic growth by setting the appropriate interest rate level, banks could essentially
maximize profitability over the long run. The Fed has proven that this task is extremely
difficult, as there are so many different factors that play a role in the decisions they make.
So perhaps it is time to try a new approach to setting interest rates; in which the basic
economic concept of equilibrium is used to determine a “Natural Interest Rate”.
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While I have been able to support my conclusions regarding bank performance,
further research is warranted to dig deeper into this complex topic. The U.S. has spent the
past century trying to create a stable economic environment through the use of monetary
policy; however, time and time again this has proven unsuccessful. Maybe this is the
correct approach and someone is close to figuring it out; or perhaps it is impossible to
control such shifts in the economy; or maybe it is time to try something new. I would
suggest that more research needs to go into the idea of a ‘Natural Interest Rate’, but for
now commercial banks should be satisfied with consistent economic growth; as making
the wrong decision with regards to interest rates could send us back in the other direction.
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Appendix A:
Auto-Correlation and Partial Auto-Correlation (ROA All Commercial Banks)
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Appendix B:
Model Results by Bank Size
Table 7: ROA Model Results - Assets >$1B
Dependent Variable:
ROAbps

Model 1
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Capital Difference
L1.

-0.0113

0.0987

Credit Risk Difference

-1.6457

0.1444 ***

Model 2
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Model 3
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0519

0.0584

0.0212

-0.1000

0.3265

-1.5716

0.0882
0.1426 ***

Efficiency Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0060

0.0072

0.0321

0.0020 ***

0.0039

0.0076

Liqudidty Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0264

0.0318

-0.0568

0.0157 ***

0.0261

0.0281

GDP Growth bps
L1.
L6.

0.1820
-0.0699

0.0380 ***
0.0254 ***

0.1738
-0.0642

0.0307 ***
0.0228 ***

GDP Growth bps sq.
L1.
L6.

-0.0005
0.0002

0.0001 ***
0.0000 ***

-0.0005
0.0001

0.0001 ***
0.0000 ***

Fed Funds Rate bps
L1.
L6.

0.3150
-0.1303

0.2094
0.0923

0.0423
-0.0501

0.0486
0.0451

Fed Funds Rate bps sq
L1.
L6.

-0.0005
0.0001

0.0003
0.0002

0.0000
0.0001

0.0001
0.0001

Recession (Dummy)
L1.

-21.6625

5.5094 ***

-50.6213

Unemployment bps
L1.

-0.0910

0.0169 ***

-0.0265

House Control
L1.

19.8578

4.6340 ***

27.9914

Economic Freedom
L1

49.3235

6.4645 ***

-258.0015

-0.9646
-0.8589
-0.7827

Constant
ARMA
ar
L1.
L2.
L3.
ma
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.
/sigma

0.7056
0.8797
0.9755
0.4025
10.1069

-26.0466

5.9747 ***

-0.0706

0.0158 ***

12.8171 **

23.2131

5.0680 ***

23.1098

30.1826

47.0001

9.0553 ***

57.8489 ***

-94.3970

234.2161

-256.4400

69.7771 ***

0.1213 ***
0.1558 ***
0.1372 ***

0.5985
-0.7745
0.3129

0.7300
0.3302 **
0.6360

-0.9758
-0.8875
-0.7947

0.1170 ***
0.1303 ***
0.1253 ***

***
***
***
**

0.2615
0.2331
1.0083
0.0367

0.6980
0.1533
0.1593 ***
0.7110

0.6321
0.8763
0.9190
0.3445

0.2358
0.1190
0.2121
0.1803

0.7455 ***

13.0793

1.2252 ***

9.6656

0.6828 ***

0.2267
0.0929
0.1796
0.1914

*1% Significance Level **5% Significance Level ***10% Significance Level
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10.7600 ***

0.0343

***
***
***
***

Table 8: ROA Model Results - Assets $100MM - $1B
Dependent Variable:
ROAbps

Capital Difference
L1.
Credit Risk Difference

Model 1
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0659
-4.1545

Model 2
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Model 3
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

0.0657

-0.0181

0.0457

0.0421

0.5430 ***

-3.0923

0.9609 ***

-3.3695

0.0755
0.6021 ***

Efficiency Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0181

0.0110 *

0.0274

0.0108 **

0.0183

0.0105 *

Liqudidty Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0570

0.0204 ***

0.1008

0.0216 ***

0.0764

0.0276 ***

GDP Growth bps
L1.
L6.

0.0318
0.0300

0.0197
0.0298

0.0066
0.0051

0.0197
0.0248

GDP Growth bps sq.
L1.
L6.

-0.0003
0.0000

0.0000 ***
0.0001

-0.0002
0.0000

0.0001 ***
0.0000

Fed Funds Rate bps
L1.
L6.

0.1015
-0.0942

0.0366 ***
0.0586

0.0017
-0.1152

0.0375
0.0519 **

Fed Funds Rate bps sq
L1.
L6.

-0.0002
0.0001

0.0001 **
0.0001 **

0.0000
0.0002

0.0001
0.0001 **

Recession (Dummy)
L1.

-27.1543

4.7382 ***

-34.6748

5.8132 ***

-29.8833

3.8919 ***

Unemployment bps
L1.

-0.1267

0.0063 ***

-0.1396

0.0081 ***

-0.1312

0.0104 ***

House Control
L1.

16.1757

4.4983 ***

24.3305

6.3337 ***

21.9662

5.0929 ***

Economic Freedom
L1

43.1287

3.2555 ***

37.5376

9.0857 ***

57.2727

9.0291 ***

-187.6542

25.4600 ***

-137.4350

-293.2430

64.8776 ***

ARMA
ar
L1.
L2.
L3.

-1.0624
-0.7610
-0.6428

0.3398 ***
0.1899 ***
0.1511 ***

-0.9732
-0.5874
-0.5509

0.3208 ***
0.3406 *
0.1342 ***

-0.9864
-0.6978
-0.6412

0.1942 ***
0.1795 ***
0.1176 ***

ma
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.

0.6764
0.0251
-0.8956
-0.8059

0.5228
0.0678
0.1635 ***
0.5548

0.9170
-0.0405
-1.1235
-0.7530

0.1509 ***
0.0322
0.0448 ***
0.1547 ***

0.6978
0.0093
-0.9746
-0.7325

0.2532 ***
0.0350
0.1024 ***
0.2537 ***

8.1229

0.7958 ***

8.9150

0.6480 ***

7.5617

0.5488 ***

Constant

/sigma

*1% Significance Level **5% Significance Level ***10% Significance Level
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69.5436 **

Table 9: ROA Model Results - Assets <$100MM
Dependent Variable:
ROAbps

Model 1
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Model 2
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Model 3
Coefficient Estimate
Std Error (Robust)

Capital Difference
L1.

-0.0305

0.0849

-0.0099

0.0463

-0.0322

0.0869

Credit Risk Difference

-4.6224

0.6799 ***

-4.3237

0.5875 ***

-3.6851

0.4762 ***

Efficiency Ratio Difference
L1.

-0.0102

0.0062

-0.0130

0.0051 **

-0.0097

0.0065

Liqudidty Ratio Difference
L1.

0.0676

0.0231 ***

0.0651

0.0143 ***

0.0888

0.0165 ***

GDP Growth bps
L1.
L6.

0.0137
0.0262

0.0250
0.0240

0.0112
0.0488

0.0252
0.0260 *

GDP Growth bps sq.
L1.
L6.

-0.0002
0.0000

0.0001 ***
0.0001

-0.0002
0.0000

0.0000 ***
0.0000

Fed Funds Rate bps
L1.
L6.

0.0654
-0.0292

0.0655
0.0427

0.0216
-0.1622

0.0313
0.0331 ***

Fed Funds Rate bps sq
L1.
L6.

-0.0001
0.0000

0.0001
0.0001

0.0000
0.0002

0.0001
0.0000 ***

-21.0014

5.1393 ***

-0.0664

0.0060 **

Recession (Dummy)
L1.

-18.0456

6.6800 ***

-1.2154

9.8721

Unemployment bps
L1.

-0.0672

0.0121 ***

-0.0606

0.0330 *

House Control
L1.

14.6416

4.3002 ***

11.3612

5.0196 ***

Economic Freedom
L1

29.4509

4.6117 ***

48.5561

8.8726 ***

-131.1136

42.1582 ***

110.2519

23.9985 ***

-273.7980

62.7595 ***

-1.1093
-1.1072
-0.9683

0.0921 ***
0.0978 ***
0.0237 ***

-0.1988
0.8292
0.0484

0.2567
0.0970 ***
0.2157

-1.2362
-1.0729
-0.8216

0.0896 ***
0.1346 ***
0.0941 ***

Constant
ARMA
ar
L1.
L2.
L3.
ma
L1.
L2.
L3.
L4.

0.9944
1.3116
0.9893
0.3044

0.1453
0.1968
0.1524
0.1613

***
***
***
*

0.2343
-0.2686
0.6729
0.6560

0.2449
0.1412 *
0.1316 ***
0.1882 ***

0.4131
-0.0810
-0.6881
-0.6439

0.1787 **
0.1197
0.1506 ***
0.1301 ***

/sigma

8.0143

1.0453 ***

8.8600

0.8133 ***

5.8638

0.4341 ***

*1% Significance Level **5% Significance Level ***10% Significance Level
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